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 Case and comment 
 CONSTRUCTIVE TOTAL LOSS—THE DIMINISHING IMPORTANCE OF 
THE PRUDENT UNINSURED OWNER 
 The Renos 
 Regarding the constructive total loss (“CTL”) of an insured ship, resulting from damage to 
the same, the Marine Insurance Act 1906 (“MIA”), s.60 provides: 
 “(1) Subject to any express provision in the policy, there is a constructive total loss where the subject-
matter insured is reasonably abandoned … because it could not be preserved from actual total loss 
without an expenditure which would exceed its value when the expenditure had been incurred. (2) 
In particular, there is a constructive total loss— … (ii) In the case of damage to a ship, where she is 
so damaged by a peril insured against that the cost of repairing the damage would exceed the value 
of the ship when repaired …” 
 Co-existing alongside this statutory defi nition is an older, common-law, test, framed 
by reference to the hypothetical fi gure of the “prudent uninsured owner”.  1  Its invention 
is credited to Lord Abinger CB, who put it thus: “… if a prudent man not insured, would 
decline any further expense in prosecuting an adventure … a party insured may, for his 
own benefi t, as well as that of the underwriters, treat the case as one of a total loss, and 
demand the full sum insured”.  2  
 How were these tests intended to relate? Commenting on the clause in their Bill which 
(with amendments) would become MIA, s.60, Chalmers and Owen noted: “The cases 
habitually refer to the ‘prudent uninsured owner’ test. But as decisions multiply that test 
becomes of diminishing importance, because the decisions tend to settle as a matter of law 
the course which a prudent uninsured owned would be bound to take. This, perhaps, is 
fortunate, because the test is not an easy one to apply …”.  3  
 In its recent judgment in  The Renos ,  4  the UK Supreme Court moved decisively in 
this direction, further diminishing the relevance of the prudent uninsured owner test 
 1 .  Arnould ’ s Law of Marine Insurance and Average , 19th edn (London, 2018) (hereafter, “ Arnould ”), 
[29.27–29.30].   
 2 .  Roux v Salvador (1836) 3 Bing NC 266, 286; 132 ER 413, 421 (Exch Ch). 
 3 .  MD Chalmers and D Owen,  A Digest of the Law Relating to Marine Insurance (London, 1901), 73. 
 4 .  Sveriges Angfartygs Assurans Förening (The Swedish Club) v Connect Shipping Inc (The Renos) [2019] 
UKSC 29; [2019] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 78 (Lords Reed, Hodge, Lloyd-Jones, Kitchin and Sumption) (hereafter “ The 
Renos SC”); partly reversing [2018] EWCA Civ 230;  [2018] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 285 ; [2018] Bus LR 1333 (hereafter 
“ The Renos CA”); and also partly reversing [2016] EWHC 1580 (Comm);  [2016] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 364 ; [2016] Bus 
LR 1184 (hereafter “ The Renos HC”). 
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490 LLOYD’S MARITIME AND COMMERCIAL LAW QUARTERLY
in determining whether a CTL exists, and confi rming its subordination to the statutory 
test in s.60. 
 Facts and issues regarding CTL 
 A fi re broke out in the engine room of MV  Renos on 23 August 2012, while it was off the 
Egyptian coast in the Red Sea. The vessel suffered serious damage, and its owners appointed 
salvors under Lloyd’s Open Form 2011 (No Cure—No Pay) (“LOF 2011”). The vessel 
was insured under hull and machinery (“H&M”) policies, on Institute Time Clauses—
Hulls (1/10/83) terms, with an insured value of US$12m, and under an increased value 
(“IV”) policy, on Increased Value (Total Loss only) Clauses (1/10/83) terms, with a value 
of US$3m. It appeared that “the vessel was close to the cusp of being a CTL”,  5  and over 
the ensuing months the vessel was surveyed several times, and owners, underwriters, and 
their respective advisors discussed numerous, confl icting repair specifi cations, estimates 
of the costs of repair, and quotations from shipyards. Owners eventually tendered notice 
of abandonment (“NOA”) on 1 February 2013. This was not accepted by insurers, and 
owners commenced their claim under the policies. 
 Insurers accepted that the casualty was consequent upon an insured peril, but disputed 
the measure of indemnity sought, arguing that it should be based on a partial, not total, 
loss.  6  Part of insurers’ defence was an item-by-item challenge to owners’ estimated repair 
costs, a strategy which failed before Knowles J in the Commercial Court.  7  Knowles J 
also held that owners had not elected not to abandon the vessel,  8  and further that owners 
had given NOA “with reasonable diligence” under MIA, s.62(3).  9  The Court of Appeal 
confi rmed these decisions,  10  which were not challenged before the Supreme Court. 
 More importantly, for present purposes, Knowles J and the Court of Appeal held 
that (i) the costs of recovery and repair incurred by owners before tendering NOA, and 
(ii) special compensation payable to salvors under the Special Compensation Protection 
and Indemnity Clause (“SCOPIC”) (operative under LOF 2011), should be included in 
the CTL reckoning under s.60(2).  11  The Supreme Court’s judgment concerned insurers’ 
appeals on these two issues. 
 5 .  The Renos CA, [42]. 
 6 .  The Renos HC, [4]. 
 7 .  Ibid , [56–93]. Similar (poor) results for insurers have obtained in other recent CTL cases, eg:  Venetico 
Marine SA v International General Ins Co Ltd (The Irene EM) [2013] EWHC 3644 (Comm);  [2014] 1 Lloyd’s 
Rep 349 , [437–493];  Suez Fortune Investments Ltd v Talbot Underwriting Ltd (The Brillante Virtuoso) [2015] 
EWHC 42 (Comm);  [2015] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 651 , [86–254]. The forensic risks that can be involved for insurers in 
challenging an assureds’ estimated repair costs seem clear, particularly where precise estimation is impossible, 
and assureds are accorded a “large margin”:  Angel v Merchants’ Marine Ins Co [1903] 1 KB 811 (CA), 816 
(Vaughan Williams LJ);  The Brillante Virtuoso [2015] EWHC 42 (Comm), [92]. 
 8 .  The Renos HC, [6–7]. 
 9 .  Ibid , [8–26]. 
 10 .  The Renos CA, [42–67]. 
 11 .  And under cll 19.2 and 9.2 of the H&M and IV policies, respectively:  The Renos HC, [27–47], [48–54]; 
 The Renos CA, [69–85], [85–94]. 
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 CTL and costs incurred by owners before NOA 
 On this fi rst issue, insurers contended that determining whether there was a CTL should 
be a forward-looking exercise, performed at the time NOA was tendered. Accordingly, 
costs expended by owners prior to abandonment should be left out of account.  12  Owners 
argued that all costs of recovery and repair relating to a damaged vessel were relevant 
under s.60(2), whenever incurred. Lord Sumption, delivering the sole judgment in 
the Supreme Court, noted the important “fi nancial and practical implications” of 
insurers’ argument: in many cases, owners would not be able reliably to estimate the 
costs of repairing their damaged vessel until it had been brought to a place of safety 
and surveyed; thus, insurers’ argument would frequently have the effect of excluding 
salvage remuneration from the assessment of whether there had been a CTL.  13  Against 
this background, Lord Sumption considered fi rst whether the wording of s.60 gave any 
support to insurers’ position. He held that it did not: references to costs of repair that 
“would exceed” the value of the ship when repaired, to “future” salvage operations and 
general average contributions, merely refl ected “the hypothetical character of the whole 
exercise and not the chronology of the expenditure”. Moreover, the language of s.60 
begged the question as to the point in time from which the CTL reckoning was to take 
place, and could not be construed as an “implicit exclusion of past expenditure even for 
the purpose of general average, let alone more generally for the purpose of determining 
whether the ship is a constructive total loss”.  14  
 Considering next the authorities from before MIA,  15  Lord Sumption noted that pre-
NOA salvage charges had been included in the CTL reckonings, “without discussion”, 
in  Holdsworth v Wise  16  and  Rosetto v Gurney ,  17  and by the US Supreme Court in  Bradlie 
v Maryland Insurance Co .  18  However,  Holdsworth v Wise can be distinguished, in that 
the pre-NOA expenditures on salvage and repairs in that case were incurred by third 
parties without the vessel owners’ knowledge or authority, and, moreover, were secured 
by a charge on the vessel which the owners would have had to satisfy before retaking 
possession. In relation to the other English authority,  Rosetto v Gurney , not mentioned 
was that the inclusion of pre-NOA salvage costs in the CTL reckoning was obiter, in that 
a partial loss obtained even when they were taken into account. 
 A conspicuous omission amongst the pre-MIA cases referred to by Lord Sumption 
is  Young v Turing .  19  In that case, owners had incurred salvage expenses of £420 prior 
to tendering NOA. In his CTL reckoning, Lord Abinger CB included the scrap value 
 12 .  A point not taken by insurers in  The Brillante Virtuoso [2015] EWHC 42 (Comm), [246–251]. 
 13 .  The Renos SC, [6]. 
 14 .  Ibid , [8]. Similarly, in the courts below:  The Renos HC, [31] and [37–40];  The Renos CA, [73] and [83–84]. 
 15 .  The Renos SC, [9]. 
 16 .  (1828) 7 B & C 794; 108 ER 919 (KB). 
 17 .  (1851) 20 LJCP 257; (1851) 11 CB 176; 138 ER 438 (CP). 
 18 .  (1838) 37 US 378. In  Saurez v Sun Mutual Ins Co (1849) 2 Sandford’s NY Sup Ct R 482 (Sup Ct NY), 
487, cited in W Phillips,  A Treatise on the Law of Insurance , 4th edn (Boston, 1854), vol.2, 280, [1541], the 
suggestion that costs of partial repairs incurred at a port of refuge, prior to abandonment, should be added to the 
estimated costs of full repairs in reckoning whether the vessel was a CTL, was recorded without disapproval. 
 19 .  (1841) 2 M & G 593; 133 ER 883 (Exch Ch). 
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of the damaged vessel and the estimated cost of repairs, but not the salvage expenses.  20  
This was clearly deliberate, refl ecting his suggested “plain way of considering” 
the prudent uninsured owner test, which was to ask: “If the underwriters had accepted 
the abandonment, would they have repaired the ship themselves …?”  21   Young v Turing 
was cited in argument in the fi rst post-MIA case referred to by Lord Sumption on this 
issue,  Hall v Hayman.  22  This may explain why Bray J accepted a concession that pre-
NOA expenditures were irrelevant,  23  as doing so arguably involved no inconsistency 
with the express language of s.60, which refers to “expenditure” and “cost” without 
indicating from what time these are to be reckoned.  24  In the second post-MIA case cited 
by Lord Sumption,  The Medina Princess ,  25  Roskill J accepted a similar submission: 
again, though it is not mentioned by Lord Sumption, Roskill J was referred to authority 
on the point.  26  
 Accordingly, the latter two post-MIA cases arguably deserved more appreciative 
consideration than Lord Sumption gave them.  27  Instead, he discounted them, preferring 
to revisit the status of pre-NOA expenses in the light of “basic principles of insurance 
law” as “affected by the requirement for a notice of abandonment”.  28  His reasoning, in 
summary, was as follows. First, the loss under an H&M policy occurs, and the assured’s 
cause of action against underwriters accrues, at the time of the casualty, and not when 
the loss is quantifi ed.  29  Second, CTL “is a legal device for determining the measure of 
indemnity”: it is “a partial loss which is fi nancially equivalent to a total loss, and may be 
treated as either at the election of the assured”.  30  Third, under MIA, s.69, “the reasonable 
cost of repairs which have been carried out is treated as the measure of the depreciation 
of the ship’s value”.  31  Fourth, whether there has been a CTL “depends on objective facts”, 
and not on “the opinion or predictions of the owner, however reasonable”.  32  Accordingly, 
the damage to take into account in a CTL reckoning under s.60(2)(ii) is “in principle the 
entire damage arising from the casualty from the moment it happens”, or, in other words, 
the depreciation of the vessel arising from the damage, “represented by the entire cost 
of recovering and repairing it”, regardless of when (or whether) this cost was incurred.  33  
 20 .  Ibid , 601–602. Lord Abinger’s approach to the CTL reckoning was subsequently held to have been ratio, 
not obiter:  Macbeth & Co Ltd v Maritime Ins Co Ltd [1908] AC 144, 153–154 (Lord Collins). 
 21 .  Young v Turing (1841) 2 M & G 593, 604–605. 
 22 .  [1912] 2 KB 5; (1912) 17 Comm Cas 81 (Bray J). 
 23 .  The Renos SC, [9]. 
 24 .  Compare Bray J’s exclusion of the value of the wreck, in this regard:  Hall v Hayman [1912] 2 KB 5, 
12–15. 
 25 .  Helmville Ltd v Yorkshire Ins Co Ltd (The Medina Princess)  [1965] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 361 , 429. 
 26 .  The Medina Princess  [1965] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 361 , 363, 453, citing:  “Yero Carras” (Owners) v London & 
Scottish Assurance Corp Ltd (1935) 52 Ll L Rep 34 (esp 40–41) (Porter J); and [1936] 1 KB 291; (1935) 53 Ll 
L Rep 131 (CA) (in which  Hall v Hayman [1912] 2 KB 5 and  Macbeth & Co v Maritime Ins Co [1908] AC 144 
were cited). 
 27 .  Or than commentators have given, viz: R Merkin, “Marine Insurance: Constructive Total Loss” (Oct 
2016) Ins LM, 1–2; DR Thomas, “Constructive Total Loss in Marine Insurance and Notices of Abandonment” 
(2018) 24(4) JIML 267, 270.  Cf J Hjalmarsson, “Constructive Total Losses: The Limits of Reasonableness” (Sept 
2016) STL 7–8. 
 28 .  The Renos SC, [9]. 
 29 .  Ibid , [10]. 
 30 .  Ibid, [11]. 
 31 .  Ibid , [11]. 
 32 .  Ibid , [12]. 
 33 .  Ibid , [13]. 
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Finally, the requirement (in some cases) under MIA, s.62, for the assured to tender NOA 
before treating a loss as total, is irrelevant to the existence of a CTL. In this regard, cases 
are specifi ed in s.62 where NOA is not so required; and under s.61, and as a matter of 
authority,  34  a CTL is a state of affairs which exists, independently and separately from the 
abandonment which the assured may elect to make where a CTL  does exist.  35  
 Insurers’ arguments to the contrary were based on the proposition—“itself not in 
doubt”—that the assured cannot claim an indemnity on a total-loss basis unless there is a 
CTL at the time of NOA (and, indeed, at the time the action on the policy is commenced).  36  
Lord Sumption distinguished the authorities relied on by insurers, in this regard, as 
relating, not to the CTL-reckoning exercise, but to ademption of loss, when “something 
happens after the casualty to reverse it” such that the assured’s indemnity is limited to their 
actual loss at the relevant time.  37  But expenditure by the owner themselves, in recovering 
or repairing the insured vessel, does not act to adeem their loss: “On the contrary, it is part 
of the measure of loss against which [the owner] is entitled to be indemnifi ed …”  38  
 The persuasive style of Lord Sumption’s reasoning should not be allowed to obscure 
the real jurisprudential choice being made in including owners’ pre-NOA expenditures 
in the CTL-reckoning exercise. Such an outcome was not predetermined by “basic 
principles” or by the language of MIA, s.60. The Supreme Court might, instead, 
have invoked Lord Abinger’s prudent uninsured owner,  39  giving more appreciative 
consideration to  Young v Turing  40  and to the post-MIA cases descending therefrom. 
This would have placed greater emphasis on the moment of abandonment, when that 
hypothetical person would be focussed on the “real choice”—repair or abandon—to 
which “sunk costs” would be irrelevant.  41  Clearly, the resulting contractual balance 
would have been different, but not necessarily unfair: CTL would still be available, in 
appropriate cases; while in other cases, substantial indemnities would be available on a 
partial-loss basis,  42  and, where applicable, for sue and labour expenses. However, this 
was not the approach adopted by the Supreme Court, and the relevance of the prudent 
uninsured owner test is correspondingly diminished. 
 CTL and SCOPIC compensation 
 The second issue in  The Renos was whether SCOPIC compensation ought also to be included 
in the CTL reckoning under MIA, s.60. Compensation under SCOPIC, as incorporated into 
LOF 2011, replaces special compensation under Art.14 of the International Convention on 
 34 .  Robertson v Petros M Nomikos Ltd (1939) 64 Ll L Rep 45; [1939] AC 371 (HL). 
 35 .  The Renos SC, [14]. 
 36 .  Ibid , [15]. 
 37 .  Ibid , [15]. 
 38 .  Ibid , [18]. Similarly, such an expenditure by insurers does not adeem their assured’s loss, for “[t]he rule 
of law applicable to contracts is that neither of the parties can by his own act or default defeat the obligations 
which he has undertaken to fulfi l [viz to pay a total loss]”:  Sailing Ship “Blairmore” Company Ltd v Macredie 
[1898] AC 593, 608–609 (Lord Watson). 
 39 .  And MIA, s.91(2). 
 40 .  (1841) 2 M & G 593. 
 41 .  The Renos SC, [6]. 
 42 .  Though not under the IV policy. 
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Salvage 1989 (“Salvage Convention”). It is intended to compensate salvors, profi tably, for 
their efforts in fulfi lling their duty to exercise due care to prevent or minimise damage to 
the environment under Art.8(1)(b) of the Salvage Convention.  43  
 In  The Renos , insurers conceded that the “cost of repairing the damage” under MIA, 
s.60(2)(ii) included the cost of recovering the vessel, but they argued that SCOPIC 
compensation, incurred by owners for the purpose of avoiding potential liability for 
environmental damage (and being indemnifi ed by P&I, rather than H&M, insurers), 
was not such a cost. This argument failed in the courts below, which held that SCOPIC 
compensation could not be divided from the remainder of salvors’ remuneration, all of 
which had to be paid if owners were to recover their vessel.  44  
 A feature of owners’ argument, which fi rst appears clearly in the judgment of the 
Supreme Court, was the concession that owners could, “in theory”, have contracted 
with salvors on terms excluding SCOPIC. They contended, nevertheless, that they were 
entitled to include SCOPIC compensation in the CTL reckoning because “a prudent 
uninsured owner would have contracted on terms that the salvors’ remuneration included 
SCOPIC costs”.  45  
 Here, Lord Sumption expressly rejected this proposed application of the prudent 
uninsured owner test. He held that, for a cost to be included in the CTL reckoning, it 
was not suffi cient that it be one which a prudent uninsured owner would have incurred.  46  
Instead, s.60(2)(ii) requires an assessment of whether a ship is “fi nancially worth 
repairing”, focusing narrowly on the costs of repair,  sensu stricto , and any further costs 
incurred for the purpose of “essential” or “reasonable” preliminaries to those repairs (such 
as salvage charges, temporary repairs near the casualty site, and towage to a repair yard).  47  
The “common feature” of all costs susceptible to be included in the CTL reckoning was 
that “their objective purpose was to enable the ship to be repaired”.  48  
 Objectively considered, Lord Sumption held that SCOPIC compensation failed to 
satisfy these tests.  49  He argued further, that if tasks relating to environmental protection 
and tasks such as towing the vessel to a repair yard had been contracted to separate 
contractors, the charges for the tasks of the former kind would clearly be excluded from 
the CTL reckoning, while those for the tasks of the latter kind would clearly be included. 
The “entirely adventitious factor” that both types of task were undertaken by the same 
contractor ought not to affect the result.  50  Moreover, under SCOPIC the two types of 
expenditure were not indivisible, but by design were made separately identifi able so that 
the former could be defrayed by P&I insurers and the latter by H&M insurers.  51  
 The rejection of owners’ proposed application of the prudent uninsured owner test 
in this context, Lord Sumption maintained, was the effect of MIA, s.60(2)(ii), which 
 43 .  For the background to SCOPIC, see JM Turner QC, “ The Renos : a Trojan Horse in the LOF Citadel?” 
(2018) 18(7) LSTL 3–7. 
 44 .  The Renos HC, [50–53];  The Renos CA, [90]. 
 45 .  The Renos SC, [23]. 
 46 .  Ibid , [26]. 
 47 .  Ibid , [24]. 
 48 .  Ibid , [25]. 
 49 .  Ibid , [25]. 
 50 .  Ibid , [25]. 
 51 .  Ibid , [27]. 
©I
nf
or
m
a 
nu
ll -
 0
8/
11
/2
01
9 
17
:1
0
© Informa UK plc. No unauthorised copying or sharing of this document is permitted
 CASE AND COMMENT 495
had resurrected the Court of Appeal’s decision in  Angel v Merchants’ Marine Ins Co.  52  
Lord Sumption explained  Angel v Merchants’ Marine Ins Co as deciding, broadly, that 
“only the comparison between the repaired value of the ship and the cost of repair 
(including steps preliminary to repair) was relevant” to determining whether a damaged 
ship was a CTL.  53  This explanation seems to obscure a further jurisprudential choice made 
by Lord Sumption in  The Renos . Post-MIA decisions on the effect of s.60(2)(ii) have cited 
 Angel v Merchants’ Marine Ins Co for a much narrower proposition, viz that the value of 
the wreck on the day of abandonment should not be accounted for in the CTL reckoning.  54  
There would seem to be no authorities, prior to  The Renos , which credit s.60(2)(ii) with 
as comprehensive an exclusion of the prudent uninsured owner test in this context, as 
that recognised by Lord Sumption, thereby severely restricting the types of “cost” and 
“expenditure” to be accounted for in the CTL reckoning. 
 On Lord Sumption’s construction of s.60(2)(ii), 
 “the prudent uninsured owner is assumed to be interested only in the comparison between the cost 
of repair and the repaired value, and his hypothetical choices are relevant  only to the quantum of 
the repair costs . The statutory solution has sometimes been criticised as illogical, but the world 
of marine insurance has accommodated it and moved on … The result is that it is necessary to 
identify the purpose of the expenditure which it is proposed to take into account, and to  apply 
the prudent uninsured owner test only to expenditure for the purpose of repairing the ship in the 
larger sense …”.  55  
 Again, the decision to relegate the prudent uninsured owner test to such a subordinate 
role in this area was not dictated by the wording of MIA, or by authority. It should be 
recognised as a novel jurisprudential choice. The fairness of the result to owners seems 
questionable: SCOPIC is very commonly employed, and in considering whether a vessel 
to be recovered and repaired is “fi nancially worth saving”, owners would surely expect 
SCOPIC compensation to be included in the reckoning.  56  That said, removing SCOPIC 
compensation from the CTL reckoning should reduce H&M insurers’ exposure to CTL 
claims, which may address some concerns about support for SCOPIC, and LOF salvage 
more generally, in the London insurance market.  57  
 Jeffrey Thomson* 
 52 .  [1903] 1 KB 811. 
 53 .  The Renos SC, [26]. 
 54 .  Arnould , [29.31–29.32], citing:  Hall v Hayman [1912] 2 KB 5, 12–15;  Yero Carras v London and 
Scottish Assurance Corp Ltd [1936] 1 KB 291 (CA), 305 (Lord Wright MR), 311 (Slesser LJ). 
 55 .  The Renos , [26–27] (italics added). The “quantum of the repair costs” must refer to the liberty accorded 
to the prudent uninsured owner not always to repair in the cheapest possible way:  The Brillante Virtuoso [2015] 
EWHC 42 (Comm), [93–94], [124–142]. 
 56 .  In relation to which,  per Lord Sumption, it should be irrelevant to the CTL-reckoning question that 
H&M insurers would not indemnify SCOPIC compensation on a partial loss basis:  The Renos , [24]. In this, 
Lord Sumption implicitly approved the position taken by the courts below that the inclusion of a cost in the CTL 
reckoning is not a claim for an indemnity in relation to that cost:  Renos HC, [47];  Renos CA, [93].  Cf Turner 
(2018) 18(7) LSTL 3–7, referring to this position as “not wholly convincing”. 
 57 .  See Turner (2018) 18(7) LSTL 3–7.
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